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THE RESURRECTION OF VICTIM IMPACT
EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL SENTENCING:
PA YNE . TENNESSEE
I. INTRODUCTION
Evidence admitted in the death sentencing phase of a murder trial
may include characteristics of the victim and the effect of the crime upon
the victim's family.' The United States Supreme Court has adopted this
strong departure from precedent2 in ruling that the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution does not raise a per se bar to victim
impact statements (VIS) in capital sentencing hearings.3 In Payne v.
Tennessee,4 the majority determined that victim impact statements do
not cause a jury's subjective and inconsistent application of the death
penalty.5 The majority further determined that history and common
practice in criminal trials have consistently allowed fact-finders to con-
sider all relevant evidence relating to the harm in assessing the punish-
ment.6 Thus, the evidence in a capital sentencing hearing should include
VIS.7 The Payne Court, with this reasoning in a divided decision, shat-
tered the fragility of the two prior United States Supreme Court
decisions.8
Victim impact evidence allows the jury to see the full extent of harm
caused by the victim's death.9 VIS includes the family's pain caused by
the victim's absence, the victim's personal attributes, and the family's
opinions of the accused's crime.10 This evidence is allowed to be heard
based on the assumption that an informed jury will more adequately de-
termine whether capital punishment is suitable in the case." Although
victim impact statements may display to the jury the true extent of the
1. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991).
2. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
3. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2609.
4. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
5. Id. at 2605.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2605-06.
8. Booth, 482 U.S. at 496; Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805 (holdings in both cases were five to four
decisions).
9. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606.
10. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502.
11. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
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harm caused by the accused, it is unfair inasmuch as the jury will be
emotionally swayed when determining what is one of the most solemn
decisions society must make-life or death.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Pervis Payne repeatedly stabbed Charisse Christopher, her two year
old daughter, Lacie, and three year old son, Nicholas, after Charisse's
refusal of Payne's sexual advances. 12 Both Charisse and Lacie died, but
Nicholas survived. 13 Payne was brought to trial and convicted. 14 Dur-
ing the capital sentencing hearing, the prosecution brought forth
Nicholas's grandmother who testified about her grandson's distress in
missing his mother and sister.15 The jury sentenced Pervis Payne to
death and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision. 6
B. Issue
At issue in Payne was whether victim impact evidence and accom-
panying prosecutor's arguments on that point should be barred by the
Eighth Amendment. 7
12. Id. at 2601. Pervis Tyrone Payne had been drinking alcohol and taking cocaine until late
afternoon. He then returned to his girlfriend's apartment which was across from the Christopher's
apartment. At that time he entered the apartment and began making sexual advances toward
Charisse. Upon refusal, Payne became violent and stabbed Charisse 42 times on her arms and
hands. Lacie suffered stab injuries to her whole body, and Nicholas was severely wounded. Both
Charisse and Lacie bled to death. Id. at 2601-02.
13. Id. at 2602.
14. Id. Payne argued that he had seen another man run out of the apartment, and he ran in
and found the bleeding bodies. In spite of this defense, the jury reached guilty verdicts on two
counts of first degree murder and one count of assault. Id.
15. Id. at 2603. The testimony by the grandmother that constituted victim impact evidence
was as follows:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home. And
he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and asks me,
Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried about my
Lacie.
Id.
16. Id. The Supreme Court only considered the issue regarding victim impact statements. The
Court did not consider two other issues resolved by the Tennessee State Supreme Court: (1) whether
the evidence was sufficient pointing at Payne; and (2) whether the evidence that the defendant pos-
sessed drug paraphernalia at the time of the arrest was admissible. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10
(Tenn. 1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 2957 (1991) (the Supreme Court of Tennessee ruling in the affirmative
on these two issues).
17. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2601.
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C. Holding
The Payne Court held that the prosecution may not be barred under
the Eighth Amendment from presenting VIS at the capital sentencing
stage of the trial.'" The Court's analysis used history, criminal proce-
dure, evidentiary balancing factors, and the Constitution to form a foun-
dation for its holding. 19
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Victims of Crimes Movement
Recently, the main focus in criminal cases has shifted from the
rights of the accused to the concern for victims' rights.20 Historically,
crime was viewed as an injury against the king or state, not the actual
victim. 2 1 This perspective was reflected by the victim's limited capacity
to participate in the criminal process. 2 Concern for the defendant's
rights overshadowed any regard for the victim's rights. Early evidence of
this practice in America is shown in the extra protections afforded the
defendant in the criminal process under the United States Constitution.23
When a victim reported a crime to the authorities, the police, lawyers,
and judges took over, leaving the victim uninformed and uninvolved. 4
The criminal justice system assumed that "despite this transfer of inter-
est, victims will come forward and cooperate, because although the state
brings the case, without the victim's cooperation, there may be no
case." 25 The victim's opinion was rarely requested, and the personal
costs incurred by the victim were considered irrelevant.2 6
18. Id. at 2609. A State may properly conclude that evidence related to the characteristics of
the victim or the effect of the loss of the victim on the family is relevant to the fact-finder's decision
concerning the death penalty. Id.
19. Id. at 2597.
20. Frank Carrington and George Nicholson, The Victim's Movement: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 2 (1984).
21. Lucy N. Friedman, The Crime Victim Movement at its First Decade, 45 PUB. ADMIN. Rv.
790 (1990). A majority of victims' rights supporters believes "that a crime inflicts feelings of
powerlessness, guilt, and rage on the victim ...." Id. at 790 (commenting that practical help,
counseling, and involvement in the criminal process can solve these feelings in the victim).
22. Id.
23. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV, V, VI, VIII, XIV.
24. Deborah P. Kelly, Symposium, Victims' Perceptions of Criminal Justice, 11 PEPP. L. REV.
15, 16 (1984) (victims of crimes soon learn the legal fiction that they are not the harmed party).
"Victims... have no standing in court, no right to counsel, no control over the prosecution of their
case, and no voice in its disposition." Id. at 16.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id. The costs included monetary costs, such as lost pay, transportation, parking, childcare,
as well as administrative inconvenience, such as delay, waiting, and postponement. Id. at 17. Many
studies focused on "administrative run-around" as the primary reason for victim uncooperation.
19921
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Although the exact date initiating the victims' movement is unclear,
the early 1980s seem to mark the period when the criminal justice system
discovered the neglected victims' rights.27 It is uncertain whether the
movement was a result of growing exponential rates of crime28 or just
disillusionment with the criminal process.29
Federal executive and legislative action culminated in the 1980s by
focusing on victims' rights and admittance of victim impact statements.
President Reagan made a proclamation for "Victims' Rights Week" in
April of 1981.30 More importantly, Congress passed the Victim and Wit-
ness Protection Act of 1982.31 This Act allowed for the admissibility of
VIS at sentencing hearings.32 Many states followed federal action and
enacted legislation providing state aid for victims of crime.33
However, these studies masked the underlying problem of the victim's lack of understanding of the
judicial process and the frustration experienced by the victim over his or her minor role in the justice
system. Id at 16-18. For a more complete discussion on administrative run-around and victim's
concerns, see id. at 17-18.
27. Carrington and Nicholson, supra note 20, at 2.
28. FRANK CARRINGTON, CRIME AND JUSTICE: A CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY 4-5 (1983).
See Carrington and Nicholson, supra note 20, at 4. As crimes increased there were more victims,
thus more people thought of themselves as potential victims. Id.
29. William F. McDonald, Towards a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return
of the Victim, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (1976). "Victims and witnesses do not receive even a
fraction of the protections and defenses that are accorded an accused. Typically, the interests of the
victim and witnesses are subordinated to what are regarded as more important interests." Id. at 662
(footnote omitted). The article also discusses examples of intimidation of a rape victim on the stand
during defendant's cross-examination. Id.
30. A portion of President Reagan's proclamation read:
For too long, the victims of crime have been the forgotten persons of our criminal justice
system. Rarely do we give victims the help they need or the attention they deserve. Yet
the protection of our citizens... is the primary purpose of our penal laws. Thus, each new
victim personally represents an instance in which our system has failed to prevent crime.
Lack of concern for victims compounds that failure.
Proclamation No. 4831, 3 C.F.R. 18 (1982) (Victims Rights Week 1981).
31. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1988). Section 2(a),
Findings and Purposes of the Act states:
The Congress finds and declares that: (1) Without the cooperation of victims and witnesses,
the criminal justice system would cease to function; yet with few exceptions these individu-
als are either ignored by the criminal justice system or simply used as tools to identify and
punish offenders. (2) All too often the victim of a serious crime is forced to suffer physical,
psychological, or financial hardship first as a result of the criminal act and then as a result
of contact with a criminal justice system unresponsive to the real needs of such victim ....
(5) While the defendant is provided with counsel who can explain both the criminal justice
process and the rights of the defendant, the victim or witness has no counterpart and is
usually not even notified when the defendant is released on bail, the case is dismissed, a
plea to a lesser charge is accepted, or a court date is changed.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Carrington and Nicholson, supra note 20, at 8-9.
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B. Initial Set Backs to the Victims' Movement
While the growing movement for victims' rights continued during
the 1980s, admissibility of victim impact evidence was stifled by the
United States Supreme Court.34 In Booth v. Maryland,3" the Court re-
viewed victim impact evidence for the first time.36 The Court catego-
rized the victim impact evidence that the prosecution admitted at the
trial level into two parts. First was the VIS that revealed the deep emo-
tional harm on the victim's family and the attributes of the victim; and
second, was the family's opinion of the accused's crimes upon the vic-
tim.37 Booth held that both types of information were irrelevant to the
death sentencing phase of the trial, and that if admitted the jury may
impose the death sentence based on inconsistent, subjective determina-
tions.3" Notwithstanding Booth's ruling, the victim movement propo-
nents believed that the decision was not a set back because it was limited
to capital sentencing cases and not extended to other criminal cases.39
Two years after Booth, in South Carolina v. Gathers,' the Supreme
Court again prohibited VIS in capital sentencing hearings. The prosecu-
tion sought to admit personal characteristics of the victim41 by reading
the evidence to the jury.42 The Court held that the prosecution engaged
34. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
35. 482 U.S. 496. Irvin Bronstein and his wife, Rose, were found by their son robbed and
murdered two days after the crime. At the death sentencing hearing the Bronstein's children made
comments to the effect of their parent's personal qualities and the negative mental and physical
effects they had experienced since their parent's death. Examples included the statements "fearful
for the first time in my life," "butchered like animals," and that defendants could "[n]ever be reha-
bilitated." Id. at 500.
36. Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2626 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502.
38. Id.
39. Philip Carrizosa, Victim Movement Dealt Heavy Blow By High Court, L.A. DAILY J., June
16, 1987, at 1. Comments were made by Ed Jagels, the chairman of the Crime Victims California
Justice Committee. Although not as concerned with the ruling in Booth, if the practice of disallow-
ing VIS was expanded to other trials, the victims' movement would suffer. However, Booth ex-
pressly limited its ruling to capital sentencing proceedings. The article also focused on the positive
attitude of civil rights activists towards the ruling in Booth. These groups believed that VIS is preju-
dicial in capital sentencing hearings when sentencing is based upon "race, social class, and the status
of the victim." Id. at 8.
40. 490 U.S. 805 (1989). Mr. Haynes was on a park bench christian witnessing when he was
assaulted and killed by Gathers. Mr. Haynes was found with christian pamphlets scattered over his
body. The prosecutor read the religious track, victim's personal prayer, voter registration card, and
described the victim's general characteristics to the jury at the sentencing phase of trial. Id.
41. Id. at 811.
42. Id. at 809. An example of a statement made by the prosecutor in his closing remarks
referring to the victim's character was:
Reverend Minister Haynes, we know, was a very small person. He had his mental
problems. Unable to keep a regular job. And he wasn't blessed with fame or fortune. And
1992]
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in an "improper argument" by reading the victim's personal characteris-
tics at the capital sentencing hearing.43 Reading this evidence was
deemed unfair because the defendant did not foresee these characteristics
before committing the murder.'
Despite the two previous United States Supreme Court decisions ex-
cluding VIS, the Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Payne,a" allowed
VIS to be admitted as harmless error.4 Anxious to overrule the decision
in Booth, certiorari was granted.47 Interestingly, the United States
Supreme Court instructed the parties to argue the VIS question even
though neither party had originally briefed the issue.4a Consequently, a
mere four years after Booth49 and two years after Gathers,0 the United
States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee"1 overruled the previous
holdings and resurrected victim impact evidence as admissible in capital
sentencing hearings.
IV. DECISION OF THE CASE
In Payne, the United States Supreme Court faced the task of deter-
mining whether victim impact statements are admissible at a capital sen-
tencing hearing under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.5 2
Included in this determination was the issue of whether the prosecution's
statements of VIS before the jury are proper.5 3 The Payne Court consid-
ered history, past reasoning in Booth and Gathers, and the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution to resolve the question.54
he took things as they came along. He was prepared to deal with tragedies that he came
across in his life.
Id.
43. Id. at 811.
44. Id. The United States Supreme Court stated:
There is no evidence whatever that the defendant read anything that was printed on either
the tract or the voter card.... [The content of the various papers the victim happened to
be carrying when he was attacked was purely fortuitous and cannot provide any informa-
tion relevant to the defendant's moral culpability.
Id. at 811-12.
45. 791 S.W.2d 10 (Tenn. 1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
46. Id. at 19.
47. David 0. Stewart, Four Spirited Dissenters, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 40.
48. Id.
49. Booth, 482 U.S. at 496.
50. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805.
51. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
52. Id. at 2604. Two categories of VIS were allowed in Payne: harm to the family caused by the
death of the victim and information pertaining to the victim's personal attributes. The third cate-
gory, the victim's family's opinion of the accused, was not offered in Payne.
53. Id. at 2609.
54. Id. at 2605. This law review note does not focus on the second issue of stare decisis in
[Vol. 27:453
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A. Axioms That Direct Criminal Sentencing
A major axiom underlying the rationale for capital punishment is
"an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth.""5 This doctrine continued
until the 18th century in the continent of Europe when crimes deserving
the death penalty began to slowly diminish. Law makers began measur-
ing the severity of crimes in relation to the victim's harm. 6
In the past, when judges had the discretion to determine the sen-
tence, the review of the crimes' harm played an important factor in exer-
cising this discretion. Payne's majority emphasized that the
seriousness of the harm should be a standard upon which a determina-
tion of the type of punishment could be decided. Using historical argu-
ments reflecting the great amount of weight given to the victim's harm,
the Court justified this standard to structure the type of punishment. 9
The Payne Court recognized today's practice in American criminal
law that allows the court wide discretion to obtain evidence in determin-
ing criminal penalties," limited only by the defendant's constitutional
rights. In United States v. Tucker,6" for example, the Court agreed that a
judge may conduct an inquiry broad in scope and unlimited as to the
kind or source of the information.62 However, the judge may not base
his decision on evidence that was obtained in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights.63
Payne. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, justified the abrupt reversal of Booth and Gathers within a
four year time span by their poor reasoning. He stated, "Booth and Gathers were decided by the
narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions."
Id. at 2610-11. Because stare decisis is not an "inexorable command," the majority felt justified in
overruling the wrongly decided cases. Id. at 2609.
55. Id. at 2605 (quoting Exodus 21:22-23).
56. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist added, "The sentence for a given offense, rather than being
precisely fixed by the legislature, was prescribed in terms of a minimum and a maximum, with the
actual sentence to be decided by the judge." Id. See JAMES A. FARRER, CRIMES AND PUNISH-
MENTS 199-201 (1880).
57. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2606.
58. Id. (citing STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF
WHITE COLLAR CRIMINALS 56 (1988)).
59. Id. at 2606-07.
60. Id.
We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose unnecessary restric-
tions on the evidence that can be offered at such a hearing and to approve open and far-
ranging argument .... So long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the
presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions.
We think it desirable for the jury to have as much information before it as possible when it
makes the sentencing decision.
Id. at 2606 (discussing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-04 (1976)).
61. 404 U.S. 443 (1972).
62. Id. at 446 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 449. Tucker was sentenced the maximum penalty based on the information that he
7
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The rationale for allowing courts such broad discretion is that the
more facts before the jury, the better suited the punishment will be for
the particular offense." In 1987, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines re-
flected this broad discretion by extending consideration beyond the crime
of the accused to include information relating to the individual guilt of
the accused and the harm caused.6" Thus, because current practice al-
lows broad use of evidence to enable a jury to make more informed deci-
sions, the majority determined VIS should be admitted in the capital
sentencing phase of a trial.6 6
B. Refuting the Inadmissibility of Victim Impact Evidence
Two previous United States Supreme Court decisions refused to
consider that the victim's harm in a crime plays an important role in
fashioning the punishment.67 The Booth Court held that VIS is not al-
lowed on a "case-by-case" basis, and that this evidence is per se inadmis-
sible unless related directly to the crime.6" The Gathers Court held that
for capital punishment to be imposed, the accused's punishment must be
related to the accused's personal accountability and guilt and not to un-
related matters. 69 Both of these decisions indicate that VIS does not con-
vey the accused's "blameworthiness" to the jury.7" However, the Payne
Court determined this reasoning faulty in that two equally culpable de-
fendants may be guilty of unlike crimes only because their conduct re-
sults in different degrees of harm.71 An example of this would be where a
defendant in a robbery acts in disregard for life shooting a victim who
subsequently lives, versus another defendant under the same circum-
stances shooting a victim who subsequently dies. 72 The evidence of the
had two prior convictions. However, the convictions were obtained unconstitutionally. In violation
of his Sixth Amendment right, Tucker, unrepresented in the prior trials, had never been advised of
his right to counsel nor did he intelligently and understandingly waive his right to the assistance of
counsel. Id. at 446.
64. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976).
65. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605-06 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINE MANUAL (1987)).
66. Id. at 2606.
67. Id. at 2605 (referring to Booth, 482 U.S. 496 and Gathers, 490 U.S. 805).
68. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10.
69. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810.
70. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
71. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist utilizes Justice Scalia's example: "If a bank robber aims his gun
at a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target, he may be put to death. If the gun unexpectedly
misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in both cases is identical, but his responsibility in the former is
greater." Booth, 482 U.S. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2605.
[Vol. 27:453
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victim's life or death will be admissible to determine if capital punish-
ment is warranted.73 Thus, courts already use information concerning
the victim's harm to determine the kind of recompense the accused will
pay society.
The Payne Court reasoned that the State should be able to admit
VIS since the defendant is allowed to admit mitigating evidence of his
character in the capital sentencing phase of the trial.74 In the past, the
Supreme Court held that the State cannot preclude evidence which miti-
gates the accused's culpability to avoid a death sentence.75 The Booth
Court added that the defendant's right to admit mitigating evidence
should preclude the State from admitting VIS. 76  However, the Payne
Court found that prior to Booth the Supreme Court had never held the
defendant should get special consideration in addition to the mitigating
evidence the defendant might introduce.7 7 The Payne Court wrote that
Booth's misinterpretation unfairly prejudiced the State in a capital trial.78
The fact that no limitations are imposed upon the defendant in what he
or she can admit as mitigating evidence is unfair to the State if it is pro-
hibited from introducing VIS.7 9 Therefore, allowing VIS into the capital
sentencing phase of trial would even the score between the State and the
defendant."
Payne's majority refuted Booth's reasoning concerning the argument
that VIS was too difficult for the defendant to rebut, and that VIS would
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2607. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (allowing character evidence to be admitted by
the accused to mitigate guilt).
75. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). The defendant's mitigating evidence in-
cluded facts of problematic family life, a father's abuse, and several emotional disturbances which
the trial court precluded from consideration. The Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments not stop the fact-finder from considering any mitigating character evidence. Id.
at 107. See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (defendant had the right to admit
mitigating evidence from two jailers and a visitor).
76. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). The Court
determined that the defendant should be treated as a "uniquely individual human being." This
focused on the defendant's right to admit mitigating evidence at the capital sentencing hearing. The
Booth Court also used this particular statement to include the defendant's right to preclude the State
from admitting VIS. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03.
77. Payne, I11 S. Ct. at 2607.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The
Mills Court precluded the sentencer from considering mitigating factors, relevant circumstance in-
cluding the defendant's character or record, and circumstances of the crime that the defendant of-
fered as support for not imposing the death sentence. Mills, 486 U.S. at 374.
80. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
1992]
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cause a "mini-trial on the victim's character.""1 The Payne Court dis-
mantled this reasoning in Booth, stating that relevant evidence relating to
the victim is already before the jury. 2 Additional evidence admitted at
the sentencing hearing may be difficult for the defendant to rebut; how-
ever, it is no different than any other burden of rebuttal.8 "
The Payne Court acknowledged the concern brought forth in Booth
and Gathers that the jury might more readily sentence a defendant whose
murder victim was an outstanding member of the community rather than
an indigent victim.8 4 Yet the Court in Payne decided that VIS is not
designed for the jury to make comparative judgments but to reveal the
"uniqueness" of each victim to enable the jury to assess the loss to soci-
ety.8" In the facts of Gathers, the victim was not a prominent member of
society and even had mental problems, but the jury still viewed him as a
"murdered human being" and imposed the death penalty. s6 It follows
from the Payne Court's analysis that VIS can be properly employed in
the sentencing phase, but only when the jury considers each victim as a
human being no matter what the victim's importance in society.
C. Constitutional Basis for Admitting VIS
The constitutional framework allows states to write and enforce
criminal laws in their respective jurisdictions; yet where the state dictates
the death penalty, the Eighth Amendment mandates upper limitations.17
The limitations include prohibiting states from restricting the factfinder's
determination of relevant evidence that would mitigate the punishment.88
However, this does not restrict the state from adding any substantive
81. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506-07.
82. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
83. Id.
84. Id. The majority in Payne refuted Booth's argument that there is an implication that de-
fendants whose victims were assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than those
whose victims are perceived to be less worthy. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 n.8. See also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972).
85. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
86. Id. The victim had been experiencing some mental problems and had undergone treatment
at a mental hospital three times. The victim believed himself to be a preacher and called himself
"Reverend Minister." Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805.
87. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607-08.
88. Id. at 2607 (quoting MeCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)). McCleskey was appealing
the death sentence as being racially applied under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
Supreme Court precluded this argument since no legislative intent to discriminate was found. Thus,
this case failed in its attempt to remedy an unfair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. MeCles.
key, 481 U.S. at 305-06.
[Vol. 27:453
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considerations not prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 9 These addi-
tional considerations could include the admittance of VIS in capital sen-
tencing hearings on the basis that this type of evidence has been used by
the sentencing authority for a long timeY0 Still, in cases where VIS
causes prejudicial harm, the defendant has a remedy under the Four-
teenth Amendment which deems such trials as "fundamentally unfair." 91
The Payne Court determined that VIS did not cause prejudicial harm
since the facts of the crime offered at trial were sufficiently violent to
inflame the jurors' passions and account for the imposition of the death
sentence.
92
Based on the historical latitude enjoyed by the states to devise proce-
dures for punishing crimes, the Court concluded that the state may allow
the jury to determine the defendant's "moral culpability and blamewor-
thiness" by considering the "specific harm" caused by the defendant.93
This conclusion is based on the State's interest in convincing the jury
that, just as the defendant is a unique individual, the victim is also a
unique individual.94 In addition, the victim's death has caused a loss to
the community as well as to the victim's family.95 Therefore, the State
appears to have an additional weapon in order to counter the defendant's
use of mitigating evidence during the capital sentencing phase. 6
D. Emotive Impact of VIS on the Jury in Capital Sentencing
Payne's dissent found two defects in allowing VIS in capital sentenc-
ing hearings.97 First, since the victim's characteristics are not foreseeable
to the defendant before the crime, the jury should not be allowed to con-
sider those characteristics for sentencing.98 Second, the "quality and
89. Payne, 111 S. CL at 2608.
90. Id.
91. Id. See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). The defendant appealed concern-
ing improper exclusion of jury member, prosecutor's improper statements, and ineffective assistance
of counsel. The Supreme Court found the trial was not "fundamentally unfair" under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 179-89.
92. Payne, 111 S. CL at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 2608.
94. Id. (citing Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2609. Payne's majority concluded that "a State may... permit the prosecutor to...
argue to the jury the human cost of the crime of which the defendant stands convicted." Id.
97. Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These defects are tied to the Eighth Amendment's
requirement that the death penalty may not be imposed "arbitrarily or capriciously." Id.
98. Id. (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)). Justice Stevens relied on Tison v.
Arizona for the principle that VIS causes capricious jury action since it breaks the "nexus" between
the crime charged and the sentence to be imposed. Id. (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149
(1987)).
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quantity" of VIS can be influential in changing a sentence from life im-
prisonment to capital punishment.99 Because every victim has varying
personal characteristics, this post-crime determination increases the risk
of "arbitrary and capricious" results."° This concern is greatest not
where VIS will make no difference, but where VIS will change life im-
prisonment to a death sentence. 1° 1 In essence, these defendants may be
sentenced to death based on the "whim or caprice" of the jurors. 102
V. CRITICISMS OF USING VIS FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING
Several problems can be found in the Payne Court's reasoning to
admit VIS in the capital sentencing phase of the trial. The problems
include: (1) ignoring the distinction between capital and non-capital
cases; (2) disregarding the Tennessee Supreme Court's evidentiary ration-
ale for allowing VIS; (3) removing the Eighth Amendment's strict scrt-
tiny requirement in capital cases; and (4) placing the State and the
defendant on equal footing in the capital sentencing hearing. These
problems reflect the holes in Payne's rationale to admit VIS.
A. Admissibility of VIS in Non-Capital Cases Does Not Justify
Admission in Capital Cases
Although courts have broad discretion to determine admissibility
questions in non-capital cases, this same discretion should not be ex-
tended to sentencing hearings. Courts should treat the death penalty dif-
ferently from all other punishments. 03 Although judges have liberally
allowed the admission of evidence in non-capital cases as well as capital
cases, more evidentiary limitations should be imposed upon capital
cases."4 An uninhibited inquiry into evidence has never been practiced
in capital sentencing hearings. 0 5 Because of the extraordinary nature of
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)). Gregg stated where the jury has
been given broad consideration of the death sentence, "that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
In the past, the Court has additionally reasoned that "[o]pen-ended reliance by a capital sentencer on
[VIS] simply does not provide a 'principled way to distinguish [cases], in which the death penalty [is]
imposed, from the many cases in which it [is] not.'" Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2628 (quoting Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)).
101. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
104. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203-04 (reasoning that as long as the evidence admitted in a pre-
sentencing hearing is not prejudicial, limitations should not be imposed).
105. See id.
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the crimes, it is clear that there is a greater risk of prejudice from al-
lowing VIS in capital sentencing hearings, as opposed to a lesser non-
capital case.106 Most states recognize this risk and allow VIS in non-
capital cases only. 107 Thus, Payne's reasoning fails to recognize that free
admission of VIS will cause a greater risk of improper application of the
death penalty. 08
B. Disregarding the Tennessee Supreme Court's Evidentiary Rationale
for Allowing VIS
The Payne Court's disregard for the Tennessee Supreme Court's rea-
soning appears to leave the door wide open for admitting VIS. The Ten-
nessee Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as the United States
Supreme Court to admit VIS in a capital case,109 but the court justified
its decision on a different basis concerning evidentiary determinations. 10
Tennessee's Supreme Court found that the grandmother's statements as
to how much her grandson misses his mother and sister, although irrele-
vant, "did not create a constitutionally unacceptable risk of an arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty, and was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." ' The Tennessee court also determined that the prosecution's
specific VIS argument to the jury was harmless error.1 12
106. Blow to Victims' Rights Movement, Cm. DAILY L. BULL., June 15, 1987, at 16. Law en-
forcement and victims' rights participants argue that VIS and retribution are "legitimate goal[s] of
society." The consideration of VIS in capital sentencing hearings broadens the state's interest in
protecting the victims of crimes. Id.
107. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.i2. Thirty-six states allow the jury to consider evidence of the
crime's emotional and financial impact on the victim. However, some of these states do not allow
VIS in crimes punishable by the death sentence. Id.
108. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2620 n.l.
109. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990), aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
110. Id. at 19.
111. Id. at 18. The Tennessee Supreme Court also resolved two issues other than VIS: (1)
whether sufficient evidence was submitted to support a conviction; and (2) whether it was proper to
submit evidence of drug paraphernalia obtained at the time of the arrest. The defendant coming out
of the apartment in blood soaked clothes was enough to convey a reasonable inference for the State.
In addition, the court determined that the State did not act in bad faith in failing to give notice
concerning the admission into evidence of the drug paraphernalia. Id. at 10, 15-16.
112. Id. at 19. The Tennessee Supreme Court determined:
The prosecutor's argument is relevant to this defendant's personal responsibility and
moral guilt. When a person deliberately picks a butcher knife out of a kitchen drawer and
proceeds to stab to death a twenty-eight year old mother, her two and one-half year old
daughter and her three and one-half year old son, in the same room, the physical and
mental condition of the boy he left for dead is surely relevant in determining his
"blameworthiness."
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The Payne Court did not specifically address this evidentiary reason-
ing of harmless error."1 3 The Court's failure to consider the Tennessee
Supreme Court's reasoning 1 4 could possibly be interpreted as an en-
dorsement of no evidentiary limitations on VIS in capital sentencing
hearings. 1" The Payne Court found no evidentiary error relating to VIS
as determined by the Tennessee Supreme Court. 1 6 Since there appears
to be no clear evidentiary hurdle for VIS of the type in Payne, the State
will most likely be able to bring in an insurmountable amount of irrele-
vant evidence in the guise of VIS.117
C. Fourteenth Amendment Situated as the Only Limitation and
Remedy to VIS
While normal rules of evidence are usually not employed at the sen-
tencing phase of the trial, constitutional requirements are still applica-
ble. 1 Historically, the United States Supreme Court has applied the
Eighth1 9 and Fourteenth Amendments to the death penalty in order to
avoid arbitrary and mandatory sentencing."" The Payne Court, how-
ever, moves away from the common application in the Eighth Amend-
ment.12 1 The concurrence stated that the Eighth Amendment's "cruel
and unusual punishment" provision has no application to VIS in death
113. See generally Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (failing to specifically
discuss harmless error, the concurrence did contend that the jury was already inflamed by the evi-
dence admitted at trial, and the VIS admitted in the capital sentencing phase made no difference in
their determination of death).
114. Id. at 2601-11.
115. See id. at 2611 (O'Conner, J., concurring) (referring to "harmless error" in definition only).
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1494 (1989). A judge is allowed to make a broad inquiry into the
facts at the hearing to determine what sentence to impose. Usually, any relevant evidence including
hearsay is admissible. This admissible evidence includes evidence that was entered at the guilt phase
of the trial or evidence that would have been admissible. In spite of the broad scope of judicial
consideration, this evidence must still be relevant and reliable. Id. (emphasis added).
119. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (per curiam) (reversing death penalty
sentences as a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
120. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447
(1984) (both cases focusing generally on the application of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
in capital sentencing hearings); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding that a
state statute imposing a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes is cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
121. Payne, II1 S. Ct. at 2609 (concluding that there is no reason to treat VIS differently from
other relevant evidence under the Eighth Amendment). See Robert P. Gritton, Comment, Capital
PunishmenL7 New Weapons In the Sentencing Process, 24 GA. L. REv. 423 (1990) (discussing two
standards used by the courts to determine if a particular punishment violates the Eighth Amend-
ment: (1) whether the sentence was of a type deemed "cruel and unusual" at the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted; or (2) whether the sentence violates evolving standards of decency).
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sentencing hearings.122 Even though the Court undercut the application
of the Eighth Amendment concerning VIS in capital cases, the Court still
allowed the Fourteenth Amendment as a means to remedy an unfair
trial.123 However, the Court never analyzed the boundaries of VIS that
would constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, but only re-
ferred to it as a "mechanism for relief."' 24 When applying this reason-
ing, courts would not review VIS as inappropriate, but would look to
whether VIS "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the result-
ing conviction a denial of due process."' 125 The concurrence found that
because the factual horror of the crime was already observed in trial, the
admission of VIS did not change the juror's mind in ruling on the death
sentence. 126 Therefore, this result afforded no due process violation.
In most cases the lack of clarity as to unfairness makes admission of
VIS constitutional. Thus, the sentencing would be fair if the jury im-
posed the death penalty based only on the evidence at trial and not the
VIS admitted at the capital sentencing phase. 127 However, where the
jury is unsure in determining the death penalty, VIS should not be intro-
duced to sway them to a determination of death. The demarcation of
knowing whether VIS made a difference in the jury's decision appears to
be strongly subjective. 128 Payne's concurrence answers this dilemma by
denoting the severity and horror of the crime.129 The more severe the
crime, the less difference the admission of VIS will make in a capital
sentencing hearing.130 This reasoning constitutes a weakness in practice
for protecting the accused from capricious sentencing because ascertain-
ing the severity of the crime is indeterminate.
The Payne Court did not consider the Fourteenth Amendment's
equal protection which protects an individual from conviction on the ba-
sis of race or varying circumstances.' 31 The writers of the Fourteenth
122. Payne, III S. Ct. at 2616 (Souter, J., concurring) (concluding there is nothing "cruel or
unusual" about a state legislature codifying VIS into law).
123. Id. at 2608.
124. Id.
125. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416
U.S. 637 (1974)) The prosecution made an ambiguous remark at the sentencing phase of trial and
the judge instructed the jury to disregard the remark. The Supreme Court held no prejudice
amounting to denial of due process was shown. Id.
126. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2612.
127. Id. at 2608.
128. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Jonathan Willmott, Comment, Victim Characteristics and Equal Protection for All: An Al-
ternative Analysis of Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers and a Proposed Standard for
1992]
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Amendment did not differentiate between people based on life, liberty,
and property. 132 It follows that under the Fourteenth Amendment an
individual should not be convicted or put to death on the basis of the
victim's individual characteristics. 133  As the Fourteenth Amendment
promotes equality in protection, so should each victim be considered
equally as one life in the sentencing phase. Therefore, admitting the vic-
tim's personal characteristics in a capital case alters the balance against
the accused's equal protection.
D. The "Powerful State" Should Not Be Allowed to Admit VIS
The contention that the State should be allowed to present VIS in a
capital sentencing hearing because the defendant is allowed to admit mit-
igating evidence to his or her character is not consistent with past consti-
tutional protections afforded the accused over the State.134  The
Constitution has never been delineated to balance the interest between
the accused and the State.13 ' The Constitution, however, does provide
rights to the accused and limitations against the powerful State to pro-
hibit overreaching of the accused's rights.13 6 Since the State can rebut in
the capital sentencing phase,137 it is incorrect to conclude that the evi-
dence is not properly balanced without the admission of VIS.
The true evidentiary imbalance is against the defendant in the ad-
mission of VIS in a capital case. Admitting the victim's character and
personal attributes does nothing but create a mini-trial for the victim. 138
Unfortunately, the defendant cannot effectively rebut VIS pertaining to
the family's opinion of the loss of the victim. VIS admissibility only
leads into issues that are not relevant to the crime and places the defend-
ant in an unfair, imbalanced predicament. Although the State may have
the Admission of Victim Characteristics in Sentencing, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1069, 1070-71 (1990)
(construing the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning that it is improper for states to distinguish de-
fendants based on classification). Thus, it follows that sentencing according to classifying victims
would invalidate the Fourteenth Amendment.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2627 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See FED. R. EVlD. 404(a). In rule
404(a), the defendant is favored over the State in that the defendant may introduce character evi-
dence while the State may only rebut.
135. Id.
136. Id. An example of a constitutional limitation upon the State is the requirement of the State
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the State is limited on the admittance of evidence that goes to the accused's propensity to
commit a particular crime.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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a legitimate interest to counterbalance the defendant's mitigating evi-
dence, this legitimate interest should not extend into VIS beyond the
breadth of the defendant's mitigating evidence. 139
VI. ROLE OF VIS AFTER PAYNE
It is very likely that the states will quickly adopt the use of VIS in
capital cases reflecting the surge of victims' rights supporters in the
United States. Several courts have dealt with the new ruling in Payne."4
Surprisingly, only one court has applied Payne on its face, deeming VIS
constitutional. 4' The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Robison v.
Maynard,42 grappled with the issue of whether the accused should be
able to put on more mitigating evidence in the trial's capital sentencing
phase since the State gets more leeway in admitting VIS. This court dis-
tinguished Payne's holding from any ruling concerning the amount and
type of the defendant's mitigating evidence. 43
At the time of Booth in 1987, at least thirty-six states allowed some
form of VIS in capital cases." Now that the Supreme Court has resur-
rected VIS, it most likely will not be difficult for the state courts to re-
sume admission of VIS into the death sentencing phase reflecting the
populous' true intent in victims' rights. The Payne Court seemed to ad-
here to the victims' rights movement pressures. 45 Because the popular-
ity of capital punishment is prevalent in today's violent society, Payne's
139. Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White determined that "the State has
a legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence [of] the defendant ... by reminding the
sentencer that just as the [defendant] should be considered as an individual, so too the victim is an
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society .... " Id. (citation omitted).
140. See, eg., Arizona v. Layers, 814 P.2d 333 (Ariz. 1991) (defendant appealing prosecution's
death penalty sentence based on the victim's family opinions). Although the VIS evidence in Payne
did not include family opinions, the Layers court still found family opinions in the capital sentencing
phase permissible. Id at 354. See also People v. Mickle, 814 P.2d 290 (Cal. 1991) (defendant argu-
ing testimony of victim's family was inadmissible under the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unu-
sual punishment" clause). Following the spirit of Payne, the California Supreme Court reviewed a
1978 death penalty law, stating evidence related to the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's
family, the families' opinions about the crime, and the victim's personal characteristics are generally
inadmissible. While these three categories are not probative of guilt, they reflect the general harm to
society as a whole and should be considered. Id. at 324-25.
141. Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1466 (11th Cir. 1991). The court found that defendant's
objection to VIS admitted in the capital sentencing hearing was moot since Payne had overruled
Booth which was defendant's foundation for objection. Id.
142. 943 F.2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1991).
143. Id. at 1217.
144. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509 n.12.
145. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2627 n.l. Justice Scalia
seemed to rely on public support for victims' rights in writing his concurring opinion.
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only solution was to follow the apparent majority of the people and in-
crease the severity of the punishment to stop the escalation in crime.1
46
Presently, the only way to challenge VIS appears to be under the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process, but even this remedy seems weak
against the fervor of the victims' movement and the recent decision in
Payne.147 Currently, the "powerful State" may present VIS to counter-
act the defendant's mitigating evidence on his character at the sentencing
phase. 48 However, the extent to which the state may allow the victim's
family to testify or the prosecution to read victim character evidence to
the jury seems strongly unbridled.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee has stripped
away any consideration of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of VIS.
This decision has overruled two previous Supreme Court cases: Booth v.
Maryland and South Carolina v. Gathers. The Court in Booth deter-
mined that VIS at the sentencing phase of a trial was barred by the
Eighth Amendment. The Gathers Court interpreted Booth as leaving a
gap which allows VIS to be admitted only when it is directly associated
with the surrounding facts of the crime. In overruling both Booth and
Gathers, Payne held that VIS was not per se barred under the Eighth
Amendment and should be considered in the capital sentencing hearing.
In essence, the Payne Court is providing a greater chance for the
State to obtain the death penalty. When VIS is admitted in capital sen-
tencing hearings, a juror is likely to desire retribution more readily than
otherwise. A juror may be reluctant to impose the death penalty know-
ing only that a defendant shot and killed a person. However, when the
same juror learns that the victim had three children and was Irominent
146. Id. at 122.
147. See Gritton, supra note 121, at 445. "While the change in procedure would undoubtedly
provide a vehicle for a jury to avenge society, the additional evidence would allow the jury to con-
sider information not relevant to the murderer's decision to kill." Id.
148. Id. at 445. Historically, the United States Supreme Court decisions have precluded defend-
ant's mitigating evidence that does not relate to the circumstances of the offense. Thus:
permitting a sentencing jury to hear such irrelevant evidence yields the same effect as im-
puting that knowledge to the defendant. The jury would then consider that evidence con-
currently with any mitigating evidence a defendant could proffer. The admission of that
evidence obviously would prejudice juries with information irrelevant to the decision to
kill, while diminishing the effectiveness of mitigating evidence.
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in the community, the death penalty will loom ever closer for the defend-
ant. Would this juror favor the death penalty if the victim was an indi-
gent verses an affluent member of society? It seems unlikely.
VIS does not aid the fact-finder to more readily determine whether
the death penalty is applicable, but merely incites a juror to desire retri-
bution for the harm inflicted on the victim. In addition, since the jury
already knows the defendant is guilty, they are more likely to make the
defendant pay for the added harm that he or she had not foreseen before
killing the victim. The elements of a state's capital punishment statute
do not require that the victim be a highly respected individual in the
community before imposition of the death penalty. Yet, that end is pro-
moted by the admittance of VIS.
VIS admissibility at capital sentencing hearings is short sighted.
VIS appears to give the State extra ammunition to obtain a death penalty
verdict; however, this verdict is not an end to itself. The defendant still
must advance through the proper appeals before the finality of the death
penalty may be employed. Supporters of VIS believe that there will be
more justice if more death sentences are given to deserving criminals.
However, in order to truly accomplish this end, their focus should be on
correcting the slow legal process, prison incapacity, as well as other defi-
ciencies in our criminal system.
John W. Cannon
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